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INTRODUCTION

Argentina's Constitution is one of the world's oldest, dating
back to 1853.'
It has been amended seven times since its
enactment;2 the most recent amendment came during the
Constitutional Reform of 1994. Undertaken by a democratically
elected constituent convention, the reform by the constituent
convention reflects the expression of the popular sovereignty.
Therefore, it is by far unclear if the judiciary, a non-elected
branch of government, can review the constitutionality of these
constitutional amendments.
In April 1998, for the first time in Argentina's history, a
district court partially nullified a constitutional amendment
enacted by a constituent convention, reasoning that the
convention exceeded its delegated authority.3 The appellate court
affirmed, but employed a different theory; it refused to address
the constitutional issue.4 This case, the Fayt case, is important to
the history of Argentine constitutional rights because it asserts
the judiciary's power over the acts of a popularly elected
constituent convention. 5
This paper argues that the judiciary has the power to review
the constitutionality of constitutional amendments; the district
court in Fayt correctly declared a constitutional reform measure
unconstitutional. Because the Argentine Constitution closely
follows the United States Constitution, this paper compares the
Argentine political system, constitution, amendment process, and
judiciary.
Part II discusses the creation of the Argentine Constitution,
as well as its ability to serve as a source of law. Part II also
develops a rationale for the 1994 reform. Part III discusses a
convention's amendment process. The first section of Part III
discusses the United States model, analyzing the arguments in
1. See NPSTOR PEDRO SAGU S, INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUCION DE LA NACION
ARGENTINA 15 (1994).
2. The Constitution was amended in 1860, 1866, 1898, 1949, 1957, 1972, and 1994.
See id. at 33.
3. See "Fayt," Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at
8-9.
4. "Fayt," L.L., 28 de Mayo de 1999, at 3.
5. It is not everyday that a court, in any country, declares a constitutional
amendment unconstitutional; therefore, the case is also significant on an international
level.
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favor of and against a limited and an unlimited convention.
Discussed in detail to serve as a comparison to the Argentine
model, the United States model also illustrates the difficulties
that may arise when a convention assembles. The second section
of Part III describes the Argentine convention process, the stages
of the reform, and Senate limitations of the powers of the
convention. Part IV provides a background for a discussion of the
Fayt case by introducing and explaining the law of convocation
for the 1993-1994 Convention, Law 24.309. Part V focuses on
cases that led up to the district court opinion in Fayt. Part VI
analyzes the district and appellate court holdings the Fayt case.
Part VII discusses arguments in favor of and against judicial
review and the implications of allowing the judiciary to review
the constitutionality of an amendment that affects the
independence of the judiciary itself. In Part VIII, this comment
concludes that the judiciary should have the power to review acts
of a constituent convention.
II. ARGENTINA'S CONSTITUTION THROUGHOUT TIME
Prior to the creation of Argentina's first Constitution in
1853/1860, Argentina had unstable and authoritarian
governments. 6 In 1852, constituents from each province, with the
exception of Buenos Aires, convened in an effort to create a
national constitution.7 The resulting document was largely a
copy of the United States Constitution."
The original Argentine Constitution provided for a federal
system of government whose powers were divided among a
President, a Judiciary, and a bicameral Congress.9 In fact,
Argentina's Constitution borrowed so heavily from the United
States, it is not surprising that through the late 1930s the
Argentine judiciary regarded U.S. case law as binding

6. See Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S.
Constitutional Practice as Authority in the Nineteenth Century Argentina and the
Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483, 1491 (1997).
7. See id.
8. See id. The Constitution is referred to as the 1853/1860 Constitution because
after its creation in 1852, it was altered according to changes suggested by the
Constitutional Convention of Buenos Aires in 1860.
9. See Miller, supra note 6, at 1511.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

precedent."0
Indeed, certain decisions make sense only if
examined from the perspective of U.S. case law.1'
Throughout this period of flux and transition, the U.S.
Constitution, particularly as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, served as a model for the Argentine Court. 2 Despite the
authority of the United States Constitution in the creation and
establishment of rule of law in Argentina, the Argentine
Constitution served the political interests of the time, retaining
the Spanish emphasis on centralization of powers in the
Executive and constraining the role of the judiciary.
By 1930, the Executive branch was the dominating power.
The possibility of having three co-equal branches of government
was merely an ideal.'3 For the next half century, Argentina saw
the rise and fall of de facto military governments. 4 Throughout
this time the rule of law varied with each incoming leader.
In 1983, President Radl Ricardo Alfonsin reestablished an
open and pluralist democracy in Argentina." The election of a
democratically elected President brought the issue of
constitutional reform to the forefront. After various projects
were presented to Congress requesting reform of the nation's
1853-1960 Constitution, the Executive Branch created the
Council for the Consolidation of Democracy (el Consejo para la
Consolidaci6n de la Democracia) to plan the process of
constitutional change. 6 Although specific areas of reform were
discussed, 7 the election of Carlos S. Menem as President in 1989

10. See id. at 1546.
11. See de ]a Torre, 19 Fallos 233 (1877); Acevedo, 28 Fallos 410, 410 (1885); Sojo, 32
Fallos 124 (1887) (pertaining to habeas corpus actions brought before the Supreme Court
by journalists detained by the Senate or House of Deputies).
12. "Writing to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1891, the U.S. Ambassador to
Argentina commented that '[n]o leading lawyer here is without his complete set of our
U.S. Supreme Court reports.'" Miller, supra note 6, at 1544.
13. In 1930, a military coup led by retired General Jose F. Uriburu, toppled an
elected Argentine government. See William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrio, Presidential
Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United States, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 25 (1993).
14. See Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina, in
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: TiHE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 309, 317-18

(Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
15. See id.
16. See FERNANDO J. CAFFERATA, NUEVAS INSTITUCIONES EN LA CONSTITUCION
NACIONAL, 15 (1996).

17. One proposed reform was a change in the President's term of office from a single
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halted the reform process. In 1993, constitutional reform was
once again at the forefront of discussion, but this time with
driving force."
In December of that year, Law 24.309 was
approved by a two-thirds vote in the House and Senate and was
then signed into law by the Executive, establishing areas of
The
reform to be handled by a constituent convention.'"
constituent convention represented all the major political parties;
no one party obtained a majority of the constituent seats. 20 A
total of 305 constituents represented the popular sovereignty."
III. THE CONVENTION METHOD OF AMENDING A
CONSTITUTION.

A.

The United States Process

In the United States, a constitutional amendment can be
proposed in either of two ways: a state-initiated proposal, or a
congressionally initiated proposal.22 Article V of the U.S.
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution,
or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Proposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof, as the one or
the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress ...

23

six-year term to a four-year term with the possibility of re-election. See SAGUS, supra
note 1.
18. Mutual concessions made by Menem, as President of the Justicialist Party, and
Alfonsin, as President of the National Committee of the Radical Civil Union, resulted in
what was termed the Olivos Pact, a constitutional reform measure that was accepted by
both Houses of Congress and the Executive. See id. at 17-18.
19. See id. at 19-20.
20. See id. at 22.
21. See id.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. 5.
23. Id.
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"It is not clear whether [Article VI contemplated that the
states could apply for a convention specifically limited to
consideration of a particular amendment to the Constitution, or
whether [it] contemplated conventions with authority to provide
generally for the revision and amendment of the Constitution."24
No guidelines are in place establishing the selection method for
delegates, the duration of the convention, or, most importantly,
its agenda and authority.25
The states have never selected the convention method of
amendment." This may be due to a combination of reasons: the
states have never felt a need to propose any amendments, being
satisfied with what Congress has proposed; the states may fear
that if a convention is assembled, it will have unlimited powers
and may re-write the entire Constitution; and Congress may fear
"runaway" state conventions and thus will propose an
amendment before a state convention can be convened.27 Since
the Convention of 1787 serves as the only example of the powers
of an Assembly, it is not unreasonable to give greater weight to
the third reason.28
Currently, there are no guidelines for the authority of a
constitutional convention. Therefore, it is unclear whether a
convention of limited powers may be assembled, or whether a
constituent convention can exist only if unlimited.
Advocates for an unlimited convention argue that "Article V,
properly construed, refers, in the phrase 'a Convention for
proposing Amendments,' to a convention for proposing such
amendments as to that convention seem suitable for being
proposed."" According to this view, if a State applies for a

24. Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional
Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627 (1979).
25. See Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States
Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, at 2 (1979).
26. See id. at 3.
27. For example, the Balanced Budget Amendment.
28. When the Convention assembled in Philadelphia in 1787, its mandate was to
revise the Articles of the Confederation. '[0]nce assembled [the] Convention presumed to
reach its own conclusion that something more than the subjects proposed for revision by
the various state legislatures was called for." William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V
Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only? -A Letter to a Colleague, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1295, 1298 (1979).
29. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution:A Letter to a Congressman, 82
YALE L.J. 189, 196 (1972).
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Convention limited to one or more proposals or subjects, such an
application imposes no obligation on Congress to grant its
request because the application was not one for a "Convention" as
denoted by the words of Article V.3" Proponents of the unlimited
convention also argue that framers of the Constitution wanted
the amendment process to include involvement of both the states
and a national forum.3' If the state legislatures can limit the
convention to a particular subject or subjects, proposal power
shifts to the state alone.32 Proponents further argue that just as
Congress was granted unlimited power to propose constitutional
amendments, there is no reason to believe the framers intended
to give the states any less authority."
Most advocates of a limited convention do not necessarily
rule out the possibility of an unlimited convention. Rather, they
believe that applications by states for limited conventions are
valid.34 The limited convention position relies heavily on the
assumption that the two amendment routes in Article V must be
viewed as parallel and essentially synonymous methods. 5
Followers of the limited convention model argue that any other
interpretation would unduly inhibit the states from initiating the
amendment procedure and, unlike Congress, when proposing a
specific amendment, limit the state's ability to achieve limited
objectives.36
Article V breaks down the convention method of amending
the Constitution into six steps. First, "the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several states" for a convention;
second, Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments;" third, Congress will have to call for the selection
of delegates and the delegates must be chosen; fourth, the
convention meets; fifth, the mode of ratification must be selected;
and sixth, the consideration of ratification by the states.37 Using
this step-by-step analysis it is easy to see that questions of
30. Id. at 199.
31. See Dellinger, supra note 24, at 1630.
32. See id.

33. See id. at 1639.
34. See Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at 1296-97. For example, if thirty-four states
apply for a convention to achieve adoption of an amendment on health insurance,
Congress is under a duty to call a convention to address that issue.
35. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 12.
36. See id.

37. Id. at 5.
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interpretation begin as early as step one. Commentators argue
over whether an application by a state seeking a convention on a
limited issue is in fact an "application" as dictated in Article V.3"
Questions as to what constitutes an "application" are not the
most difficult." "The main difficulties lie in what Congress could
and would do, what the dynamics of the delegate selection
process would be, and above all, what a convention could and
would do. '
The major problem that could arise, even if Congress were to
call a limited convention, is as follows: at the third step, the
convention delegates would probably be chosen in popular
elections." "Those convention delegates could legitimately speak
as representatives of the people. And those delegates could make
a plausible case that a convention is entitled to set its own
agenda."' 2
If Congress refuses to submit the convention's
allegedly "unauthorized" proposals for ratification, it would run
into "substantial constitutional counterarguments and equally
substantial political restraints." 3 The argument would read
something like this: even if the proposals were outside the
mandate given to the convention, the people elected the delegates
and before the proposals can be made part of the Constitution,
the people must elect to ratify the proposal. Therefore, the
ratification process serves as a safeguard for the convention
method of amending the Constitution to ensure that even if the
convention becomes a "runaway" convention, final approval by
three-fourths of the states is still required. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, the Argentine Constitution does not provide for a
ratification process.44

38. See Black, supra note 29.
39. Gunther, supra note 25, at 7
40. Id.

41. See id. at 8.
42. Id. at 8-9.

43. Id. at 9.
44. See GERMAN J.

ToMo I 380 (1996).

BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL

DE LA CONSTITUCION REFORMADA
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B. The Argentine Process
The Argentine Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Constitution may be totally or partially amended. The
need for reform must be declared by Congress by a vote of at
least two-thirds of its members; but it shall not be carried out
except by an Assembly summoned to that effect. 5
The Argentine Constitution has been reformed on multiple
occasions by both de facto and elected governments. 6 Today,
amendments from only five reforms remain in effect; these are:
the reforms of 1860, 1866, 1898, 1957, and 1994. 7 The reform or
amendment process under the Argentine Constitution can be
broken down into two stages: the initiation or declaration stage,
and the revision stage. 8 Most constitutions allow for a third
stage of ratification, however, as previously mentioned, the
Argentine Constitution does not.49
The first stage of reform under the Argentine Constitution is
the initiation or declaration stage, where a decision is made that
a reform is necessary and the initial steps to begin the process
are undertaken."0 Article 30 charges Congress with control over
this first stage of the reform process; "[t]he need for reform must
be declared by Congress."'" The provision does not say how
Congress should undertake this task; it merely states that a twothirds vote is required.52 Specifically, Article 30 requires a vote of
at least "two-thirds of the members of Congress."" The standard
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Two-thirds, as it relates
to each House of Congress, can be calculated according to: the
total number of members in each House, the total number of
members participating in the debate, or, the number of members

45. ARG.CONST. art. 30, ch. I, pt. I (author's translation).
46. See N9STOR PEDRO SAGugs, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ToMo I
330 (1997).
47. See Id.
48. See BIDART CAMPOS, supranote 44, at 380.
49, See id
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See id.at 381.
53. Id.
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present at the particular session. 4 Considering the Constitution
as a whole, the intent of the framers appears to be to calculate
two-thirds according to the total number of members in each
House.5 Whenever the framers intended the calculation to take
into account those members present, they refer specifically to the
"present" members.56
The mandate given to Congress at this first stage of the
reform process is not clearly defined. Although Congress knows
it must declare the need for a reform, Article 30 does not say
what method Congress must use.
There are two possible
methods: Congress can pass either a law or a joint resolution.57
The matter seems to have been decided in favor of passing a
law.58
In fact, all constitutional reforms, enacted under an
elected government, have been declared pursuant to a law.59 A
constitutional reform law or law of convocation, like any other
law, can be vetoed by the Executive." Granting the Executive
veto power over the law may seem nonsensical because even if
the President vetoes the law, it will again return to Congress for
a two-thirds vote in order to override the veto.6' However, veto
power allows the President the opportunity to express reasons as
to why Congress should reconsider its decision and possibly
suspend the amendment process. 2
Some commentators argue that Congress should not have to
pass a law to declare a reform.6" They argue that because the act
is political, rather than legislative in nature, it should not be a
law.64 Also, if the act is not a law then it will not be subject to
Executive veto.65 Because Article 30 vests in Congress the power
to declare a constitutional reform, there is a good argument for
disallowing an Executive veto. However, because Article 30
seems to pose more questions than it answers, enacting a law
will set clear guidelines as to the content, nature and duration of
54. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 381.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
SAGURS, supra note 46, at 330-31.

id. at 331.
id.
id.
id.
id.

63. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 380.

64. See id.
65. See id.
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the reform process. Further, even if the President is not given
the power to veto the law, the President should be afforded the
opportunity to express any concerns regarding a constitutional
reform.
When Congress does declare the need for a constitutional
reform, whether through law or joint resolution, it must specify
the articles or provisions that need to be revised.66 This provides
an agenda for the Assembly that clearly states what
constitutional material may be amended. Although the Assembly
does not have to introduce amendments for all or any of the
provisions listed, it may not introduce amendments pertaining to
provisions outside of those specified by Congress because
Congress, through the law of convocation, limits the power of the
convention.67 Congress can also limit the duration, procedures,
and place at which the convention may take place.6" Therefore,
the idea of a limited convention is better established in
Argentina, than in the United States.
The first stage of the reform process also requires the
participation of the electoral body. 9 The Constitution does not
state what electoral system must be used when selecting
delegates to the convention; the decision is left to Congress."
Congress may not, however, assign any of its legislators to an
Also, although the Constitution does not
Assembly seat.7
mandate that the Assembly be elected by popular vote, all
an elected government have been
assemblies gathered under
72
elected by popular vote.
The second stage of the reform process is the revision stage.
This is when the actual reform takes place.73 The Constitution
leaves this stage to the control of an ad hoc convention known as
the assembly. 4 The assembly has both explicit powers (those
conferred upon it by the law of convocation), and implicit powers
(those necessary for the assembly to carry out its mandate).7 5
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id.
See SAGUkS, supra note 46, at 334.
See id
See id.

71. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 382.

72. See SAGUPS, supra note 46, at 334.
73. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 380.
74. See id. at 381.
75. See SAGUtS, supra note 46, at 334.
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The assembly, in accordance with the law of convocation, may,
among other things, declare its own by-laws, decide the type of
sessions it will hold and where they will take place, determine
what majority will be required, and elect officers." Since the
Argentine Constitution does not require ratification of
amendments, once the assembly approves amendments, it can
publish them so long as the law of convocation does not say
Some assemblies, rather than publishing the
otherwise.7"
amendments themselves, have passed them on to the Executive
or other federal branch of government and allowed that branch to
promulgate and publish the reform. 78
The requirements necessary under Article 30 to enact an
Unlike
amendment create a rigid mechanism of reform.7"
standard law making, in order to amend the Constitution, a
special body must be called together and Congress must decide
what exactly that body will review."0 It is unclear whether the
Constitution sets limits on the assembly's powers, but Congress
is limited by the Constitution and the Assembly is limited by
Congress."1 Specifically, the necessary two-thirds vote limits
Congress's ability to call a convention, whereas Congress, in the
law of convocation, limits the constitutional provisions and issues
the assembly may review.82 It has been argued, that when a
reform violates either one of these limits, the resulting
amendment is unconstitutional." Whether or not this is accurate
depends on the law of convocation (if it speaks to the matter) and
the ability of the courts to review the acts of a constituent
convention.
IV. LAW 24.309
In 1993, when Congress declared the need for a
constitutional reform, they did so pursuant to the passage of a
law-Law

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

2 4 . 3 0 9 .'

Although constitutional reform measures

See id.
See id. at 335.
See id.
See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 378.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
SAGUI S, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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had been in play for quite some time, talk of a constitutional
reform resurfaced because of the desire to amend Article 77 of
the National Constitution to allow the immediate re-election of
the president.85 The Justicialist Party initiated a bill calling for a
6
constitutional reform of specific articles of the Constitution.
Although the bill passed the Senate, the opposing party did not
approve of the bill and thus it was clear that it would not attain
A compromise
the required two-thirds vote in the House.
between current President Carlos S. Menem, Head of the
Justicialist Party, and ex-President Radl R. Alfonsin, President
of the National Committee of the Radical Civil Union, led to the
Another bill calling for a
signing of the Rosada Accord.8
to the Senate and
be
presented
constitutional reform was to
The Accord had
House.
House for a two-thirds approval in each
of Basic
Nucleus
three parts: the first created the
Understanding, the second stated the issues that would be
openly debated by the constituent convention, and the third
specified the means that would be required to implement the
agreement. 8 The House of Representatives or Chamber of
Deputies approved the bill by two-thirds vote without any
modifications." From there the bill went to the Senate, which
amended it to remove the proposal limiting the term of a senator
to four years." Rather than returning the bill to the Deputies, as
constitutionally required, the Senate passed the bill directly to
the Executive, who promulgated the bill as Law 24.309 on
December 29, 1993.2

Law 24.309 established two areas of reform.92 First, the
"Nucleus of Basic Understanding" (Article 2), which provided for
the immediate re-election of the president, created the position of
"Chief Cabinet of Ministers" and increased the number of
senators to three per province. 4 The second area of reform
85. See id. at 16.
86. See id. Proposed changes included direct election of senators and a reduction in
their terms; extension of the legislative sessions, and incorporation of a duty-free zone
among others.
87. See id. at 17.
88. See id. at 17-18.
89. See id. at 18.
90. See id. at 18-19.
91. See id. at 19.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 20.
94. See id.
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included issues such as the relations between the Nation and the
provinces, political parties, and electoral systems, etceteras. 9'
This area of reform was subject to open debate for each issue."
The legitimacy of the Law was questioned on procedural and
substantive reasons. Procedurally, the Law was challenged
because the Senate failed to abide by Article 71 of the
Constitution (now Article 81), which required the amended bill to
return to the originating House for re-approval before
presentation to the President.97 Substantively, Article 5 of Law
24.309 was challenged as an unconstitutional imposition of a
block voting method." Article 5 prohibited splitting the thirteen
issues included in the Nucleus of Basic Understanding for
separate votes.99 The issues had to be voted on as a block
through a straight "yes" or "no" vote.' ° This voting method
creates what appears to be a ratification system because the
Assembly could not debate the issues and make changes as it saw
proper."' Instead, the Assembly was required to either approve
or reject all the amendments as a whole.1" No court ever decided
whether Congress exceeded its authority in the first stage of the
reform process when enacting Article 5.1"3
Perhaps the most significant provision of Law 24.309 is
Article 6. Article 6 declares null and void any measures enacted
by the Convention whose reform was not called for under Articles
2 or 3.14 The question remains, however, which branch of
government has the power to declare such an act null. Some
commentators have argued that the judiciary has no control over
the acts of a constituent convention. °5 Although much has come
to pass since the Supreme Court's holding in Soria de Guerrero,""
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 21-21.
See id.
See 1994 ARG. CONST. art. 81, ch. V.
See SAGUS, supra note 1, at 20-21.
See generally BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 383-84, 401.
See id. at 384.
See id. at 385.
See id.
See "Romero Feris," [1994-El L.L. 14. The Court did not reach the issue because

prior to adjudication the Assembly agreed to accept the voting system prescribed in
Article 5. (The issue had become moot.)
104. See BiDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 401.
105. See id. at 379; SAGUPS, supra note 46, at 336. Sagu~s qualifies his argument by

stating that if the Assembly's act is grave and manifest, it will be declared
unconstitutional by the judiciary.
106. See BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 44, at 379. The Court, in Soria de Guerrero,
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the courts have not yet taken a solid stand on what areas of the
reform process are reviewable." 7
The question of what branch of government has the power to
review the acts of a constituent convention has been the subject
of several Argentine Supreme Court cases.'
One reason this
question poses difficulty for the courts is the fact that the
Constituent Convention derives its power from Congress, and it
may therefore be argued that the question was committed to
another branch of government, namely Congress.
V. CASES LEADING UP TO THE FAYT DECISION.
A.

The Rios Case

The Fayt decision is the first to declare that a reform enacted
by a constituent convention is unconstitutional."0 The decision,
however, is not the first to address the issue of the Constituent
Convention and Law 24.309. In December 1993, the Argentine
Supreme Court decided the case of Antonio J. Rios."' Rios asked
the Court to declare partially null a reform to the Constitution of
the State of Corrientes that was enacted by a Constituent
Convention."' The Court refused to consider the matter, holding
that the question was a matter of provincial, not federal law.'
held that the constitutionality of a constitutional reform is a non-justiciable political
question. [Fallos: 256:556, 19631.
107. For example, a 1995 provincial decision refused to decide an amparo to require
the President to republish the 1994 Amendments to include a forgotten article. The court
held that the power of judicial review extends solely to concrete cases and that the
amparo action is permitted only as an exceptional remedy where concrete and grave
danger exists. See "Perez Alsina, Juan A.," [1995-A] L.L. 387.
108. These cases will be discussed throughout the next section.
109. See Emilio A. Ibarlucia, Control Judicial de la Validez de Una Cldusula
Constitutional, Li., 18 de Agosto de 1998, 1, 3 (explaining that the powers of a
constituent convention are derived from Congress and are therefore limited to those
powers that Congress may assert).
110. This is not, however, the only country that has reviewed the constitutionality of
a constitutional amendment. In Germany, for example, the Constitutional Court
considered the constitutionality of an amendment to Article 10 of their Constitution, the
Basic Law, which would replace judicial with administrative recourse in the area of
telecommunications.
See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon,40 EMORYL.J. 837, 852 (1991).
111. "Rios," [1994-C] L.L. 46.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 48.
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The Court, however, realizing that a reform of the Nation's
Constitution was in the works, seized the opportunity and in
dicta stated:
[Ilt is necessary to bring to the forefront that the powers
conferred

upon the

Constituent Convention are limited

powers. The Convention may derive its power from the law
that brings it together and authorizes the measures it is to
reform. However, it is worthy of mention that the authority of
a constituent convention is limited solely to the review of
those matters submitted to them
for resolution and within the
114
principles of the Constitution.

Although the obitur dictum stated in Rios opened new
ground for future decisions, it may be argued that the Court still
evaded its role as guardian of the law through procedural
avenues. The Court did make mention of the limited powers of a
Constituent Convention, but by upholding the decision of the
State Superior Court-which found that the Convention was
acting within its authority"'1 -the Court failed to consider the
constitutionality of the reform vis-a-vis the National
Constitution. Argentine commentator Miguel M. Padilla, argues
that because the Convention was given no indication of what
constituted its power, it was free of legal bounds and therefore
established a Municipal Public Rights principle contrary to the
National Constitution (or in its best case scenario, very
questionably congruous to it)."6 The Court fostered new ideas,
but was not prepared to take substantial steps in its decisionmaking process.
B.

The Polino Case

Four months later, the Argentine Supreme Court decided the
Polino case."' There, Hector T. Polino and Alfredo P. Bravo, as
citizens of Argentina and national deputies of the Federal

114.
115.
116.
[1994-C]
117.

Id.
See id.
See Miguel M. Padilla, Una OportunidadDesaprovechaday un Riesgo Evitable,
L.L. at 48.
"Polino," [1994-C] L.L. 291.
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Capital belonging to the Socialist Democratic Party, filed suit to
declare null the legislative process that enacted Law 24.309.118

The Court held that as citizens they lacked standing to challenge
the law because
they did not establish the required "case" or
"controversy." 119
Further, the Court held that as national
deputies, they only established a general interest and the Court
required a specific interest as to the hanns caused."' The Court
emphasized that without a case or controversy the judiciary
could not act because it would violate separation of powers.''
There are two noteworthy points regarding the Polino case.
The first point is the absence of the political question doctrine.
The majority's opinion answers whether a case or controversy
existed in terms of whether a concrete "interest" was present.
The Court makes no mention of the political question doctrine.
Instead it rejects the appellants' claim because they believe the
appellants did not sustain actual injury.'
By evading the issue
of the "political question," the Court prevented the permanent
exclusion of the issue from judicial review, thereby allowing the
issue to resurface. In effect, the Supreme Court was taking steps
to broaden its power of judicial review and become involved in
the Nation's reform process.
The second significant element of the case is the dissent
written by none other than Carlos S. Fayt. He asserted that
Congress has the power to choose the method by which to amend
the Constitution but that that method must conform to
Constitutional standards.'
Fayt rejects the notion that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. He states that "in the same degree
that citizens have a right to attack the Constitution they have an
equal right to defend it when it is being deharmonized and is in
danger of being altered in unforeseeable ways."'24 For Fayt, the
process of lawmaking is a justiciable question for the Court that
does not violate separation of powers. Throughout his opinion

118. See id. at 302.
119. See id. at 294. The court stated that there was no immediate, concrete or
substantial interest that they could claim. Instead, they were merely stating a concern of
the general citizenry. See id.
120. See id. at 296.
121. See id.
122. Maria Angelica Gelli, Reforma Constitucional, Control Judicial y Proceso
Democrdtico, [1994-C] L.L. at 298.
123. See id. at 304-07.
124. Id. at 305-06.
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Fayt illustrates his vision of the Supreme Court as an
authoritative branch of government with powers crucial to the
democratization of Argentina.
C. The Feris Case
The penultimate case in which the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the constitutionality of Law 24.309 and the
Constituent Convention was the Romero Feris case.'25 Jose A.
Romero Feris, a member of the Constituent Convention, filed an
action to declare unconstitutional Article 5 of Law 24.309.126
Article 5 states the method of voting the Convention is to follow
when deciding matters included in Article 2 of the reform law.
Here, the Court did not need to answer the question of standing
or political question. By the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, the Assembly had already approved, by a majority vote,
the voting method prescribed to it by Congress.'27 Therefore, the
question presented to the Court had become moot, and the Court
did not reach the substantive issues in the case.
Once again, Carlos S. Fayt dissented in Romero Feris. Fayt
urged that the issue before the Court did not become abstract
merely because the Convention declared a rule on the matter.12
The judiciary, according to Fayt, still retains authority over the
constitutionality of the enacted rule, particularly where the
power of the Convention is a limited power."'
The most recent decision concerning judicial authority over a
constitutional reform is the Fayt case decided on April 30, 19980
and affirmed by the appellate court on November 19, 1998.1'

125. "Romero Feris," [1994-El L.L. 14.
126. See id.
127. See Rios, supra note 111.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 23. Fayt cites to the Rios case, supra note 111, when declaring that
the power of the Constituent Convention is a limited power.
130. "Fayt," Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at 1.
131. "Fayt," L.L., 28 de Mayo de 1999, at 3.
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VI. THE FAYT DECISION
Carlos S. Fayt, a Justice on the Argentine Supreme Court,
filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to invalidate
a measure limiting the term of office of Supreme Court Justices
enacted by the Constituent Convention of 1994.132 Fayt filed his
action under two theories. First, he claimed that the Constituent
Convention was only authorized to reform those constitutional
provisions specified under Articles 1 and 2 of the reform Law
24.309. a He argued that within those articles the Convention
was given the power to modify the removal process for inferior
federal judges, but that the power did not include limiting the
term of office of Supreme Court justices.
Second, Fayt
contended that the reform introduced by the Convention in
Article 99 of the Argentine Constitution, requiring all federal
judges upon attaining seventy-five years of age to be renominated was contrary to Article 110 of the Constitution.'
Article 110 is the equivalent of Article III of the United States
Constitution and states that Supreme Court Justices shall hold
their offices for life during good behavior.3 6 Fayt argued that
Article 99 was unconstitutional and that under Article 6 of Law
24.309, the courts were given the power to invalidate any reform
enacted by the Convention that was not within their delegated
authority.137
The district court held that Article 99 was partially null
because the Assembly was acting outside its delegated
authority.'
The case exemplifies a district court establishing
itself as guardian of the rule of law. The court did not use case or
controversy or political question as a front. Quite the contrary,
the court gave broad meaning to the notion of injury in fact and
explicitly declared that the powers of the constituent convention
were limited.39 This decision marks the first time in Argentina's
132. See "Fayt," Suplemento de Derechu Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at
8.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 4-5.
id. at 4.
id. at 3.
ARG. CONST. art. 110.
"Fayt," Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at

4-5.
138. See id. at 8.

139. See id.
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history that a court declared unconstitutional a constitutional
amendment.
According to commentator Emilio A. Ibarlucia, two factors
contributed to the Fayt holding: the abandonment of the political
question doctrine, and the recognition of a declaratory judgment
action as a proper mechanism for nullifying an unconstitutional
act.14
The court found that the reform provision creates in
Supreme Court Justices an uncertainty with regard to the
lifetime appointment granted to them in Article 110 of the
Argentine Constitution, and that this uncertainty provoked an
actual injury capable of judicial review."
On November 19, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision declaring Article 99 of the Constitution partially
4
null."
The appellate court held that Article 99 of the reformed
Constitution (the new law) does not apply retroactively and is
4
therefore invalid as to judges appointed before the 1994 reform."
The appellate court avoided the constitutional issue by
employing a fundamental canon of interpretation. The court
stated that under Argentine Supreme Court precedent, declaring
a law unconstitutional is only done as a last resort and
interpreting a statue to avoid conflict with constitutional
guarantees is preferable. ' The court stated that retroactive
application of the new law must be prohibited to avoid
infringement of a constitutional right guaranteed under a
different legal regime." '
The canon of construction employed by the Argentine
appellate court is also a fundamental tool for U.S. courts.'46 This
principle, however, is generally used in the interpretation of
140. See [barlucia, supra note 109, at 6-7.
141. See "Fayt," Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at
8.
142. See "Fayt," L.L., 28 de Mayo de 1999, at 2.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 3.
145. See id.
146. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1934), Justice
Brandeis stated in his concurrence:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the court will decide only
the latter.
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statutes. It is unclear whether such a tool can be used in
reviewing the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment.
By basing their holding on an interpretation of the
amendment, the judiciary evaded its role as guardian of the
democratic process. The court ignored the fundamental issue in
the case and left open the possibility that a constitutional
amendment enacted by a constituent convention can be
unconstitutional. The court never reviewed Law 24.309 or the
mandate given to the Assembly, therefore, the question remains
for review by the Supreme Court, or for the day when a judge
appointed under the new law reaches seventy-five years of age." '
VII. REVIEWABILITY: IS IT THE PROPER ROLE OF THE COURTS?
In Argentina, the power of judicial review is based upon
Article 31 of the Constitution as amended in 1994. Article 31
establishes the Constitution, laws enacted by Congress, and
treaties with foreign nations as the supreme law of the nation."8
Article 116 of the Constitution establishes the Supreme Court
and the lower courts of the Nation as having jurisdiction over
cases dealing with matters governed by the Constitution and the
laws of the Nation.
Article III, § 1, of the United States Constitution vests in the
federal judiciary "the judicial Power of the United States" and
147. Recently, the Venezuelan Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
the Assembly brought together by the people to reform the constitution was a
"constitutional assembly" or a "constituent assembly". The difference between the two
being that the mission of a constitutional assembly is solely to reform the constitution,
while the mission of a constituent assembly is to draft a new constitution and change the
laws and institutions that need change. The Venezuelan Supreme Court held by a
majority vote that the Assembly is a constituent assembly. To date the Assembly has
shut down Congress and suspended judges. In response to the Court's decision, Justice
Cecilia Sosa Gdmez denounced as Justice of the Court and in a press release stated that
the Court has committed suicide by being submissive to the Assembly. G6mez said that
the Assembly was brought together solely to reform or draft a new constitution and that
the actions of the Assembly contradict principles of democracy. See Cecilia Sosa G6mez,
Rueda de Prensa de la Doctora Cecilia Sosa G6mez Presidente Saliente de la Corte
Suprema de Jusiticia con Motivo de la Autodisoluci6n de la CJS (visited Feb. 24, 2000)
<http://politica.eud.com1l999/08/241240899a.html>.
If the Argentine Supreme Court fails to address the issue of the Assembly's mandate it
too runs the risk of committing suicide by allowing a constituent convention to exceed its
powers. The Court must guard the principles of democracy. If it fails to invalidate Article
99, as to Supreme Court Justices, it further increases the already vast powers of the
Executive while diminishing its own powers.
148. ARG. CONST. art. 31.
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the concomitant responsibility to adjudicate cases and
controversies. 49 In the United States, Marbury v. Madison set
the framework for judicial review."' Chief Justice John Marshall
made two arguments as to why the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution should be the law."' First, he
claimed that it is the Court's job to "find and apply the law in all
cases."'52 "It is emphatically the province and the duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule."'53 Second, Marshall "asserts that the Court must give
supremacy to the Constitution because that is the purpose of a
written constitution ... ,"' Since the Constitution granted the

Court jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution,"1 5'
such language, Marshall argued, must mean that the Court also
has the power to interpret the Constitution."' Further, because
the Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution is supreme,
the Court's interpretation must also be supreme.
The limits of judicial power and the proper role of the
judiciary in the constitutional scheme are matters of great
controversy. In January 1998, statements were submitted to
Congress, focusing on the need for an increased role for Congress
in debating and legislating constitutional issues. Professor
Robert L. Clinton argued that the Supreme Court has a
monopoly in the area of constitutional law and that monopoly
rests on two arguments. First, a political argument that "judicial
control of the Constitution is required in order to protect
individuals and minority groups from the majority tyranny which
would be implemented by legislatures in the absence of the
judicial monopoly."'58 Second, the argument for a monopoly is a
149. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
150. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 11 (1976) (arguing that Marbury v. Madison

gave "birth to the now judicial power to rule upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress").
151. See Cox, supra note 150, at 12-13.
152. Cox, supra note 150, at 12. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78;
153. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
154. COX, supra note 150, at 13.
155. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
156. See id. at 178-80.

157. See id. at 178.
158. Congress and the Courts: Hearingon Congress, the Court, and the Constitution,
Written Testimony of Robert Lowry Clinton Submitted to the Subcommittee on the
Constitutionof the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) available in 1991 WML
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historical argument that "judicial supremacy in constitutional
matters is grounded in American constitutional history,
especially in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.""9
According to Clinton, the Framers did not intend for the judiciary
to have sole say in the interpretation of the Constitution, in fact,
it was not until 1950s that the Court used Marbury as precedent
for it "ultimate interpretive authority."6 ° For those that espouse
the views of Clinton, the idea that judicial review is all or
nothing, translates into a theory of judicial supremacy.
Whether Congress or the courts should be the final
arbitrators of legislative enactments has always been a recurring
issue."' The issue becomes more heated when what is being
reviewed are the acts of a constituent convention representing
the will of the people. The main argument against reviewability
by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts is that it is
antithetical to democratic principles because federal judges are
appointed by the president and have no accountability to the
people.' 62 This concern develops into what commentators have
labeled the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."' 63 This means that
the Supreme Court, the majority of which constitutes only five
justices, could decide a case that goes against the will of the
However, when a president nominates a justice to the
people.'
Court, the Senate must approve the nomination by a two-thirds
vote. 6' A president will usually nominate only those he thinks
are favorable to his ideals, so while the people do not elect the
judges, those that nominate and approve the appointment are
accountable to the people. Further, because the judges are not
tied up in the election process, they are unfettered from political
pressures when making interpretations.
While arguments may be made regarding the increased
power of the U.S. federal courts, this does not mean that
Congress should replace the judiciary as final interpreter.

36832,at *2.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *11 (internal quotes omitted).
161. See id.
162. This argument favors granting the power of reviewability to Congress; a branch
elected by and accountable to the people. See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins
and Implications of JudicialReview, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 359 n.76 (1998).
163. NINO, supra note 14, at 309.
164. See id.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2; ARG. CONST. art. 99, ch. 3, pt. 3.
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Congress is not designed, either institutionally or politically, to
rule on difficult constitutional questions. First, because both
houses are large, Congress is unable to engage in effective
constitutional debate. "Because of the volume of legislation, the
time spent with constituents, and the technical knowledge
required to understand the background of every piece legislation,
it is infrequent that a member considers the individual merits of
a particular bill."166 Second, Congress is often faced with having
to enact legislation in a timely manner and constitutional issues
are put on the back burner.'6 7 Politically, Congress is pressured
by constituents and lobbyists to pass laws favoring their
respective interests. In order to appease their constituents and
win re-election votes, members of Congress may neglect
their
68
responsibility to "support and defend the Constitution."
Abner J. Mikva 6' argues that members of Congress can play
a role in making constitutional judgments by screening
legislation for constitutional shortcomings and clarifying their
motivation for the legislation. ° In this way, congressional input
is guaranteed because Congress will have already reviewed
legislation for its constitutionality and if the courts must review
the legislation, they have congressional debates to guide them.
The idea of judicial supremacy in Argentina is impossible
under the current system where the Executive rules.
The
Argentine Supreme Court is regarded by the public as a corrupt
branch of government serving the demands of the presiding
Executive. "Public opinion polls in recent years have indicated
that over two-thirds of respondents consider the Supreme Court
as politicized and lacking independence from the Executive,
almost the same number consider it 'very corrupt' or 'corrupt,'
and a plurality of forty seven percent even consider the Court
institutionally 'obsolete.""'7
Commentator Jonathan M. Miller

166. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983).
167. See id.
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
169. Abner J. Mikva was a member of the 91st-92nd Congress, 94th-96th Congress,
and a former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
170. See Mikva, supra note 166, at 608.
171. Jonathan M. Miller, JudicialReview and ConstitutionalStability: A Sociology of
the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 15152 (1997).
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states that while the Constitutional reform of 1994 was quite
extensive in trying to diffuse the power of the president, it in fact
had little practical impact on the Argentine government.' 72 "The
President continues to act as head of a government structure
where most expectations and authority are focused on his
office.""7 3 The appellate court's holding in Fayt confirms Miller's
statements because by not reaching the fundamental issue in the
case the Court failed to exert its power of review over the acts of
a constituent convention and expanded the power of the
Executive by granting it the power to remove any federal judge.
A further issue arises, however, in a case such as Fayt where
the judiciary is reviewing an amendment that affects the
independence of the judiciary itself. Some may argue that due to
personal bias it is bad public policy to grant the judiciary the
final say over such an amendment. It must be remembered,
however, that the power of the judiciary is not an unlimited
power. The control or authority vested in the judiciary must be
measured so as to not replace the will of Congress or the
Convention for that of the judiciary."'
The underlying issue in Fayt is not the contents of the
amendment, but rather the limits of the Convention as declared
in the law of convocation. The court's power of review is limited
to determining whether or not the Assembly exceeded its
mandate.
Under the Law of Convocation, 24.309, the
Convention's authority was limited to modifying the removal
process for inferior federal judges. 7 5 The amendment enacted by
the Assembly applied to all federal judges.'
The court did not
have to reach the question of whether the amendment was
consistent with the old law. It simply had to determine whether
the reform measures enacted by the Assembly exceeded their
mandate.
If so, then arguably the enactment was
unconstitutional.
While Marshall's arguments may not add up to conclusive
proof that the Constitution confers supremacy over constitutional
172. See JONATHAN MILLER, ARGENTINA, INTRODUCTORY NOTES: CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND, xii-xiii.
173. Id. at xiii.
174. See Gelli, supra note 122, at 300.
175. See "Fayt," Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, L.L., 18 de Agosto de 1998, at
176. See id. at 8.
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questions to the judicial branch, the claims have been validated
by history.117 "[Tihe assertion of judicial power to hold acts of
Congress unconstitutional [is] a building-block of national unity,
accepted as necessary to make the system work."178 In Argentina
there is an equal-if not greater-need to have a body umpire the
new democratic system. Appropriately, that body is the judicial
branch.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly held that the reform introduced
as Article 99 of the Argentine Constitution is unconstitutional
because the Convention exceeded its mandate. The appellate
court based its holding on an interpretation of the amendment
and failed to address the fundamental issue in the case. Namely,
whether the Assembly exceeded its mandate and if so, whether
the amendments enacted outside of that authority are
unconstitutional.
The holding leaves open the question of
whether the judiciary has the power to declare unconstitutional a
constitutional amendment enacted by a constituent convention.
As Fayt argued, it is the courts that should have the power to
declare constitutional reform measures unconstitutional.
Arguably, Article 6 of Law 24.309 authorizes the judiciary, as the
branch of government that must "harmonically interpret the old
and new versions of the Constitution,"79 to declare null any act

outside of the Assembly's agenda.
Ultimately, whether the judiciary should have the power of
review in the area of constitutional reform, depends on what role
we think the courts should play in the political and social arena.
Are the courts guarantors of constitutional rights, guardians of
the political process, or both? 8
The role of the courts is
intertwined. It must preserve the continuity of constitutional
rights and protect the democratic process. Fayt is a perfect
example of the intermingling of the courts' roles. The district
court forged ahead and declared the sanctity of the constitutional

177.
178.
179.
[1994-D]
180.

See COX, supra note 150, at 16.
Id. at 23.
Maria Angelica Gelli, Relacion de Poderes en la Reforma Constitucionalde 1994,
L.L. at 1086.
See id.
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right granted to Supreme Court justices,"' and at the same time
established itself as guardian of the democratic process by
holding that the law of convocation limits the authority of the
Assembly and that the courts have the power of judicial review
over a convention's reform measures.
ILEANA GOMEZ °

181. The guarantee of a term of office for life subject only to good behavior. See ARG.
CONST., art. 110.
'Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2000, University of Miami School of Law.

